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8 November 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DIA and DOS review(s)

C U R R E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E
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MOBILE "ICBM"



FROG - TYPE TACTICAL ROCKET

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8 Nov 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Photos

*USSR: The 48th anniversary of the October Revolution provided the Soviets another opportunity to display weapons systems not seen before by Western observers.

The parade through Red Square featured a large missile, in a canister and mounted on a self-propelled launcher, which was described by the Soviets as a mobile "ICBM." One Soviet officer told a US attaché on 5 November that this missile was solid fueled, was capable of ranges in excess of 2,700 nautical miles, and had been operational since 1963

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In line with an apparent emphasis on improved ground forces fire power and mobility, two new variations of Soviet tactical missiles were paraded. One of these resembled a Frog-type rocket, and may be a new short range tactical missile. The other looked like the Scud. Frog missiles have a range of less than 50 miles; the most advanced Scud has a range of about 150 miles.

A mobile anti-aircraft system, consisting of four machine guns with their own radar and mounted on an amphibious tank, was also displayed for the first time.

The Soviets also paraded missiles they have shown before. These included the Savage--a three-stage solid fuel ICBM--the Galosh antiballistic missile, and the large ICBM designated Scrag. As before, the Soviets described the Scrag as an "orbital" weapon; TASS claimed that it is capable of delivering a nuclear warhead "at the first or any other loop around the earth."

Defense Minister Malinovsky's address before the parade was a short and relatively mild performance castigating the US on Vietnam and charging that West Germany was "openly reaching for nuclear arms!"

First Deputy Premier Polyansky's keynote address at the celebration underscored the desire of Soviet leaders

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to give priority consideration to domestic policy matters. His speech provided a further indication that the USSR, confronted with the US commitment in Southeast Asia, has little choice but to mark time on the major issues which divide the two great powers. He reaffirmed, however, Moscow's intention to give the DRV "full political support and the necessary economic and military aid." Polyansky's comments on the past year's developments within the international Communist world seem to reflect the satisfaction with which Soviet leaders probably view the USSR's improved position in its contest with the Chinese.

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
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8 NOV 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

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Indonesia: The four-hour plenary cabinet meeting on 6 November appears to have done little to change the power relationship between Sukarno and the army.

Sukarno may be edging toward a formal proscription of the Communist Party (PKI), but if he does take such action, it is likely to be within the context of broader measures intended to ensure Communist survival in some form. Sukarno told the cabinet that he was considering banning the PKI but warned that he would ban all parties if they do not help create a calm atmosphere. In a press briefing after the meeting, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio said the President was considering action against the Communist Party "in proportion to the PKI's mistakes."

Sukarno made clear that he would not go along with the army's effort to depose Subandrio who is also foreign minister. He stated that "Subandrio stays at my side," and that "Indonesia has never had such a great foreign minister."

As a result of army pressure, however, another cabinet minister, Oei Tjoe Tat, has been relieved of his functions but retains ministerial status. Oei Tjoe Tat, a crypto-Communist, had been assigned without portfolio to the cabinet presidium and had been a trusted henchman of both Sukarno and Subandrio. His functions included some responsibility for internal security and entitled him to use the services of both Subandrio's Central Intelligence Bureau and the palace's "Special Affairs" bureau. Sukarno announced at the cabinet meeting that he had "sent" Oei Tjoe Tat to Macao but did not specify the mission.

The Indonesian Army, essentially ignoring Sukarno, continues its anti-Communist measures. In central Java it has dissolved the civil defense staff headquarters in most cities in three areas which are under strong Communist influence and has placed civil defense

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facilities under the direct control of local military commanders. In most instances these commanders are already concurrently serving as acting mayors or district heads.

The Indonesian Foreign Office has notified the diplomatic and consular corps in Djakarta that "due to the internal situation at this time," neither official nor unofficial travel by members of foreign missions will be permitted outside Djakarta until further notice.

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NOTES

Congo: Pro-Kasavubu and pro-Tshombe' forces are moving toward a test over parliamentary approval of the Kimba government on or before 18 November. Tshombe' appears relaxed and confident he can block Kimba's approval and his residence is described as a "political Grand Central Station." Over the weekend the Congolese Parliament called for a vote on Kimba soon, but Kimba[—who is now himself expressing doubts over his chances for approval—] told US Embassy officials there were "many problems" to be worked out and did not specify when he would make the try.

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Japan: The government used forceful tactics over the weekend in securing Diet committee approval of the pending treaty to normalize relations with South Korea. This has given impetus to the leftist opposition's campaign to discredit Prime Minister Sato's handling of the issue. Leftist street demonstrations and obstructionist tactics in the Diet probably will continue but are not expected to block the government's plans to secure final ratification. [The security forces are prepared for the possibility of large-scale disorders, but] so far the left has had little success in generating widespread support for its efforts against the treaty.

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

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